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This paper integrates endogenous fertility behavior into a model of the distribution of
consumption and wealth in a competitive market economy. In particular, we examine under
what conditions endogenous fertility leads to a non-degenerate distribution of consumption and
wealth among dynasties in the long run when preferences are time-separable. We show that, if
dynasties have a common discount factor and preferences over number of children satisfy a
normality assumption, all steady states are characterized by equality of capital stocks and
consumption among families. We also provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the steady
state. In order to illustrate these results, we present an example in which preferences over
number of children are logarithmic and the technology is Cobb-Douglas. For this combination of
preferences and technology, there exists a unique egalitarian steady state. Moreover, the
economy converges to this steady state in only one generation. We also show that, if dynasties
are heterogeneous in their discount factors, more altruistic dynasties have higher fertility rates
than less altruistic dynasties in all steady states. Also, assuming a normality condition for fertility
and consumption, we show that more altruistic dynasties own higher capital stocks and consume
more in steady state than less altruistic dynasties. Even though the stationary distribution of
consumption and wealth is non-degenerate at each point in time, asymptotically all dynasties but
the most altruistic one become an infinitesimal part of the population.1
1. Introduction
This paper investigates the interaction between endogenous fertility behavior and the
distribution of income and wealth in a competitive market economy. Specifically, we examine
under what conditions endogenous fertility leads to a non-degenerate distribution of
consumption and wealth among dynasties in the long run.
Stiglitz (1969) develops a general equilibrium model of the distribution of income and
wealth among individuals, in the context of a neoclassical growth framework. Stiglitz analyzes an
economy in which agents are divided into a finite number of long-lived families with mortal
members in each generation. Different generations of a given family are linked through
intergenerational transfers. In his model, the economy-wide capital stock is determined
simultaneously with the distribution of capital among individuals. Stiglitz shows that, under the
assumption that bequests are a linear function of family income, the steady state level of the
economy-wide capital stock per capita is globally stable and wealth and income are
asymptotically evenly distributed among families
1.
It has been shown, however, that the results in Stiglitz (1969) depend crucially on the
assumption that families have linear bequest rules. If one assumes that bequests are determined
endogenously by utility-maximizing agents, Stiglitz’s results on the long-run equality of income
and wealth among families do not hold in general, unless additional restrictions are imposed on
preferences.
Becker (1980) analyzes a model that is similar to Stiglitz (1969) in all aspects, except
for the fact that he assumes that infinitely-lived agents maximize a time-additive utility function
with a constant rate of time preference. He shows that the household with the lowest discount
rate owns all the capital in the long run. If households have equal discount rates, then the steady
state distribution of income is indeterminate.
                                                                
1In Stiglitz’s model, different families receive the same wage rate and differ only in their per capita wealth
holdings. The assumption that bequests are linear in income implies that an increase in per capita wealth by
a given percentage raises bequests by a smaller percentage. As a result, the wealth per capita of the poorer
families grows faster than that of the richer families.2
Lucas and Stokey (1984) argue that the strong implications for the long-run distribution
of income and wealth derived by Becker (1980) do not arise from any economic feature of the
model, but are simply consequences of the assumption that preferences are additively separable
over time. For this reason, they argue that it seems necessary to use a broader class of
preferences in order to analyze the long-run distribution of wealth.
Lucas and Stokey (1984) study an optimal growth model in which preferences are
recursive, but not necessarily additively separable over time. They show that, if preferences
exhibit a property labeled increasing marginal impatience, which means that the consumer’s
discount factor is a decreasing function of steady state consumption, then there will exist a
unique interior stationary distribution of consumption and wealth.
Sarte (1997) shows that, even if preferences are additively separable, progressive
taxation may generate stationary equilibria with a non-degenerate wealth distribution in a
competitive growth model. Sorger (2002) shows in the context of a Ramsey growth model with
time-additive utility functions that, if households have market power on the capital market, there
may exist a non-degenerate stationary distribution of capital.
This paper integrates endogenous fertility behavior into a model of the distribution of
consumption and wealth in a competitive market economy. In particular, we examine under
what conditions endogenous fertility leads to a non-degenerate distribution of consumption and
wealth among dynasties in the long run, even if preferences are time-separable.
This paper considers a society divided into a finite number of dynasties, in which
individuals from different generations are altruistically linked. All the members of a given dynasty
have the same physical capital holdings, but dynasties differ in their per capita holdings and their
size (number of members). Different dynasties interact in competitive markets for goods and
factor services in each period. Parents are assumed to derive utility from their consumption,
number of children and the well-being of each child.
If dynasties have a common discount factor, the model implies that they choose the
same fertility rate in steady state, so the shares of each dynasty in the population are constant.
We provide sufficient conditions on dynastic preferences and the costs of child rearing such that,
in any steady state, all dynasties have the same capital stock. This egalitarian result follows from3
a normality assumption on fertility. We also provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the
steady state.
If dynasties have different discount factors, we show that in any steady state more
altruistic dynasties have higher fertility rates than less altruistic dynasties. Also, assuming a
normality condition for fertility and consumption, we show that more altruistic dynasties own
higher capital stocks and consume more in steady state than less altruistic dynasties. Even
though the stationary distribution of consumption and wealth is non-degenerate at each point in
time, asymptotically all dynasties but the most altruistic one become an infinitesimal part of the
population.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the setup of the model with
common discount factors and defines a competitive equilibrium for the economy. Section 3
defines a steady state and an egalitarian steady state and provides sufficient conditions for
uniqueness of an egalitarian steady state. Section 4 shows that, if preferences over number of
children are logarithmic and if the technology is Cobb-Douglas, then there exists a unique
egalitarian steady state, which is globally stable. Section 5 provides conditions for a non-
degenerate steady state distribution of income and wealth when dynasties differ in their discount
factors. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model with Common Discount Factors
The setup of the model is the following. Society is divided into a finite number of
dynasties. We define a dynasty or family line as a collection of agents composed of a parent and
all his descendants. We assume that the economy starts with a finite number of parents, who in
turn define a finite number of dynasties, indexed by  M j ,..., 1 = . Agents live two periods, the
first as children, in which they do not make any economic decisions, and the second as parents.
Each period is taken to be a generation.
There is a large number of firms endowed with the same constant returns to scale
technology, so we can assume, without loss of generality, that there is only one firm, which
produces the only consumption good according to an aggregate constant returns to scale4
production function, described by  ( ) N K F Y , = , where  K and  N  denote aggregate capital
and labor, respectively.
2
Let  y  denote output per worker and k  denote the aggregate capital-labor ratio.
Assumption 1. Assume that the production function satisfies the following properties:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 lim   , lim   , 0    , 0 ,   0 0         1 ,
' '
0
' ' ' = ¥ = < > = ” =
¥ ﬁ ﬁ k f k f k f k f f k F k f y
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In each period, firms sell goods to the household sector and agents supply their labor at
a wage  w and rent their capital to firms at a rental rate  r. The economy is assumed to be
competitive, so both agents and firms take prices as given. Competition and profit maximization
by firms together imply that factors are paid their marginal products and firms earn zero profits.
This implies the following conditions:
( )
'
tt rfk = (1)
( ) ( )
'
tttt wfkkfk =- (2)
Parents have identical preferences and supply inelastically one unit of labor. All the
currently alive members of a given dynasty have the same stock of physical capital but dynasties
differ in their per capita physical capital holdings. Moreover, dynasties may differ in size
(number of members).
In this economy, agents are indexed by the dynasty to which they belong. Let   
i
t k
denote the capital stock of a member of dynasty i in period t and 
i
t N  the number of members
                                                                
2Since each agent supplies one unit of labor, the number of hours supplied is equal to the size of the
population.5
of dynasty  i. A typical member of dynasty  i derives his income from the wage rate  t w  and
from capital 
i
t k , which earns rent at the rate  t r . Capital depreciates at the rate d .
We assume that each child has a fixed cost f  in units of the consumption good, so 
i
t n f
is the total cost of child-rearing, where 
i
t n  is the fertility rate of dynasty  i in period t. Parents
choose a bequest  1
i
t k +  for each child, so total bequests equal  1
ii
tt nk + . Parents also spend their
resources on their own consumption 
i
t c . The problem of the head of dynasty i is the following
3:
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where 01 b <<  is the discount factor, which is the same for all dynasties by assumption
4. The
constraint  1 0
i
t k + ‡  states that dynasties cannot borrow to finance current consumption and
expenditures on children.
5
Assumption 2.  Assume that  ( ) , ucn is strictly increasing, concave and twice
continuously differentiable in both c and n, with  ( ) ( )
00
lim,, lim, cn cn ucnucn
ﬁﬁ =¥=¥.
Definition 1.  A competitive equilibrium is a sequence










==  which satisfies the following conditions:
                                                                
3This formulation of the budget constraint incorporates the interaction between quantity and quality of
children analyzed in Becker and Lewis (1973), Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) Becker and Barro (1988), Barro and
Becker (1989), Benhabib and Nishimura (1993), Alvarez (1999) and Lucas (2002).
4 Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) used a similar formulation in the context of an aggregative model of optimal
growth with endogenous fertility. However, since in their model all agents have identical preferences and
capital stocks, it is not suitable for an analysis of the long-run distribution of capital.
5 Becker (1980) and Sorger (2002) also assume borrowing constraints in their models of the long-run
distribution of wealth.6
1) For each t, the pair ( ) , tt rw  satisfies (1) and (2), respectively.




+ =  solves the maximization
problem (3).
3) The factor markets clear in every period, i.e., 
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4) The goods market clears in every period, i.e.,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
1








In addition to (1) and (2), the budget constraint in (3) and condition 3 in definition 1, a
competitive equilibrium is characterized by the first-order conditions of the dynasty's problem:







d +++ =-+ (4)
( ) ( )( ) 1 ,,
iiiii
nttcttt ucnucnk f + =+ (5)
Equation (4) is the Euler equation with endogenous fertility and (5) is the first-order
condition for the optimal number of children.
3. Steady State
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium  E is a steady state if it is a constant sequence
( ) { } ( ) ,,,,,,/1,...,
iii EwrkyckniM == .7
Definition 3.  An egalitarian steady state is a steady state with
( ) ( ) ,,=,, ,1,...,
iiijjj ckncknijM "=
Let  1 Rr d ”-+  be the steady state gross interest rate. We can characterize the steady
state with the following system of equations:
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iiii cnkRkwiM f ++=+= (8)
( )
' 1 Rfk d =-+ (9)
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From (6), it can be seen that the effective discount factor is given by  i n
b
, so that steady
state fertility behaves as a time preference parameter. This implication will be crucial for the
results below.
In the subsequent analysis, it will be assumed that a steady state exists (that is, there
exists a solution to (6)-(12).
6 We will focus on the issue of uniqueness of the steady state.
In order to solve for the steady state, we will use the following strategy. First, we will
postulate an economy-wide capital stock per capita k . From (9) and (10), we can express the
interest rate R and the wage rate w as functions of k :
( ) ( )
' 1 RRkfk d =”-+ (14)
( ) ( ) ( )
' wwkfkkfk =”- (15)
Using (6)-(8), we will solve for  ,,and 
iii ckn  for a given pair  ( ) , Rw. Using (14) and
(15), we will define a mapping from k  to the individual capital stock  ( ) , ii kkk =Y . Then we
will use (11) and (12) to solve for the equilibrium k .
From (6), it is clear that in any steady state all families have the same fertility rate, given
by
     1,..., i nRiM lb =="= (16)
After substituting  (16) into the left-hand side of  (7), we can write the steady state
marginal rate of substitution between children and consumption as a function of steady state
consumption and fertility as follows:
                                                                
6In section 4, we will provide an example of a combination of preferences and technology for which a steady
state exists.9
( ) ( )
( )
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From (8), we can write   as a function of  and   (for given  and )
ii kcRw l :











Notice that  0 R l ->, since  R lb = . If we substitute (17) and (18) into (7), we
obtain












We want to find restrictions on  ( ) , ucn such that  (19) defines
( )  as a function of ,,
i cRwl . Throughout this analysis, we will keep  ( ) ,, Rwl  constant and
view both sides of (19) as functions of 
i c .
Remark 1 . From assumption 1, there exists a 
~
k > 0 such that
( ) k f k k k k £ £ £ £ ~ ~ , for all 0  and  ( ) f k k k k < > , for all  ~. Hence,  [ ] X k = 0,~  is the set
of maintainable capital stocks.
Assumption 3. Assume that  ( ) ( ) fR k w k ~ ~ - > 0, where 
~
k  is the maximum sustainable
capital stock per capita.
Remark 2. Since  ( ) ( ) / wkRk is strictly increasing in  k , assumption 3 implies that
( ) ( ) fR k w k k X - > " ˛ 0   .10








One way to interpret this assumption is that it requires the net cost of producing a descendant to
be positive. An additional child costs f  in the current period, which is worth  Rf  next period.
Since an additional descendant will earn  w next period, when he becomes an adult, the lifetime
cost of an additional adult is fR w - , which is positive from assumption 3.
Assumption 4.  ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
,











”‡  satisfying (6)-(12).
Lemma 1 states that, in any steady state,    ,1,...,
ij ccijM ="=
Lemma 1. Let assumptions 1-4 hold. Then there is at most one ci  that solves (19) for
given ( ) ,, Rwl .












If we divide both sides of (19) by 
i c  and rearrange the terms, we obtain:
( ) ( )
1













From (16) and assumption 3, the right-hand side of (20) is strictly decreasing in 
i c .
Differentiating  ( ) , with respect to 
ii cc l W , we obtain:














From assumption 4 and (21),  ( ) ,
i c l W  is weakly increasing in 
i c  at the steady state
solution, so the left-hand side of (20) is weakly increasing in 
i c  at any such solution. Since the
right-hand side of (20) is strictly decreasing in 
i c , there exists at most one 
i c  satisfying (20).
QED
The derivative of  ( ) , with respect to 
ii cc l W  can be related to the utility function


















where all derivatives are evaluated at steady state values.
To gain some intuition on the restriction imposed on  ( ) ,
i c el , consider the following
problem:
7
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where v is utility per child and I  is income. In this problem, k
'
 is held constant.
Definition 4. n is normal if the maximizing value of  n in (23) is increasing in  I  for all
values of f  and k
'. This is equivalent to the condition  0 ccnncc uuuu -> .
8
                                                                
7The following argument is motivated by a similar reasoning in Lucas (2002).12
If we assume that n is normal in the sense defined above, the first term in the numerator
of (22) will be positive at the steady state solution. Yet, these conditions are not enough to
guarantee the existence of a unique 
i c  satisfying (20), since the second term in the numerator of
(22) is also positive. Hence, we need the stronger condition  ( ) ,1
i c el ‡ .
The intuition for this result is the following. Richer dynasties desire to have more
children, since children are a normal good. Yet, they also face a higher price of children,
because they invest more in each child. Hence, it might be possible to have a steady state in
which two dynasties with different capital stocks and consumption find it optimal to have the
same number of children. The condition  ( ) ,1
i c el ‡  requires the income effect on fertility to be
strong enough, in the sense that the numerator of (22) has to be positive.
In light of Lemma 1 and using  (16), we can define
( ) ( )  as a function of ,, ,
ii cRwcRw p = . The following proposition states that all steady
states are egalitarian.
Proposition 1. Let assumptions 1-4 hold. Then all steady states are egalitarian, that is,
they satisfy ( ) ( ) ,,=,, ,1,...,
iiijjj ckncknijM "= .
Proof. From equation  (16) and Lemma 1, we obtain that, in any steady state,
( ) ( ) ,,  ,1,...,
iijj cncnijM ="= . Since, in any steady state,  ( ) , and 
i cRwR plb == , we















                                                                                                                                                                                                
8This condition can be obtained by differentiating implicitly the first-order conditions associated with (23)
with respect to  I  and by requiring the derivative of the maximizing value of  n  with respect to  I  to be
positive.13
From (24), it is clear that       ,1,...,
ij kkijM ="= .            QED
From  (14) and  (16), we can define  ( ) ( )   as a function of ,  kRkk llbl =” .
Differentiating  ( ) k l  with respect to k , we obtain:
( ) ( )
'' 0                                kRk lb =< (25)
since  ( ) ( )
''' 0 Rkfk =< . Equation (25) states that when the economy-wide capital stock per
capita is higher, the fertility rate is lower. The reason is that a higher k  reduces the interest rate,
so fertility has to be lower in order to reduce the effective rate of time preference.
From (14), (15), (20) and (25), we can define 
i c  as a function of  k ,  ( )
i cCk = ,
where  ( ) C k  satisfies:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
1


















Definition 5. c is normal if the maximizing value of  c in (23) is increasing in  I  for all
values of 
'  and k f . This is equivalent to the condition  0 ncncnn uuuu -> .
Assumption 5.  0 ncncnn uuuu ->  (c is normal).
Lemma 2. Let assumptions 1-5 hold. Then  ( ) C k  is strictly decreasing in k .14
Proof. The appendix shows that, if we differentiate (26) implicitly with respect to k , we
obtain:
( )























Øø Øø -+-- ºß Œœ -W
Œœ - ºß =<
Øø -G Œœ W+
Œœ - ºß
(27)
The denominator of (27) is positive, since Wc ‡ 0 (which follows from assumption 4),
f - > G 0 (which is equivalent to assumption 3) and  ( ) 0,1 b ˛ . The term  n W  in the numerator








which is negative from assumption 5. From the feasibility condition  (13), we have
( ) ( ) 1
i fkkc d +-> . Hence, the term inside brackets in the numerator of  (27) is positive.
Since  ( ) ( ) R k f k
' '' = < 0, we have established that  ( ) C k
' <0.           QED
The intuition for this result is the following. A higher k  is associated with lower fertility,
which raises the marginal rate of substitution between number of children and consumption, from
the assumption that  c is normal. The normality condition on fertility requires consumption to
decline. A change in k  also affects the cost of fertility through changes in  w and  R. By using
the fact that, in equilibrium,  R and  w are related to marginal productivities, one can observe
that the net (negative) effect of an increase in the wage rate on the cost of child rearing
dominates, which reduces consumption further (this is captured by the first term in the numerator
of (27)).15
Substituting (14), (15),  ( ) ( ) ( )  and 
i cCkkRk llb ==”  in (18), we can write 
i k
as a function of k ,  ( )
i kk =Y , which satisfies:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )










Since    ,1,...,
ij kkijM ="= ,  (11),  (12) and  (28) imply that the steady state
economy-wide per capita capital stock k  must satisfy the following condition:
( )                                 kk Y= (29)
Equation (29) equates the desired individual capital stock to the economy-wide capital
stock per capita. The next proposition provides conditions under which  (29) has a unique
solution for k .
Proposition 2. Let assumptions 1-5 hold. Then there exists at most one economy-wide
capital stock per capita k .
Proof. If we view both sides of (29) as functions of  k , the right-hand side is just the
45-degree line. If we differentiate (28) implicitly with respect to k  and rearrange the terms, we
obtain:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
''''
'













i kk = , (30) is reduced to16
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
''
'











since  ( ) C k
' <0 from  (27),  ( ) l
' k < 0 from  (25) and  ( ) ( ) ( )
' 110 fk bd --+> , from
assumption 1. Hence, the function  ( ) Y k  has a negative slope when it crosses the 45-degree
line, which implies that it can cross it only once, establishing the desired result.
4. Example: Log Preferences
9
Let  ( ) ( ) ( ) ,loglog        0   0   01 ucncn ghghb =+>><<
Let  ( )            0    01 fkAkA
a a =><<             1 d =
4.1. Steady State
For this specification of preferences, the steady state marginal rate of substitution
between number of children and consumption is
( ) ( )
( )
,






















l W”  is given by






                                                                
9Logarithmic preferences for children have been recently used in Lucas (2002).17
which does not depend on 
i c . From  (32),  ( ) ,1
i c el = , so assumption 4 is satisfied. It is








1 A . Assumption 5 amounts to
2 0 nn u
h
l
=-< , which holds in this example.
Since assumptions 1-5 are satisfied for this example, propositions 1 and 2 imply that
there exist at most one steady state for this combination of preferences and technology, and it
must be egalitarian.
For this example, we can solve the steady state equations (6)-(12) and obtain a closed-































We need the additional restriction  ( ) 0 habgh -+>  to guarantee existence of a
steady state with positive consumption, capital and fertility.
4.2. Stability
In this subsection, we analyze the stability of the steady state computed above. We
assume that the economy starts at time  0 t = . Let superscripts index dynasties and subscripts
denote the time period (assumed to be a generation). We assume that there are  M  dynasties,18
with initial capital stock  0 , 1,...,
i kiM = . The dynamic system associated to the competitive




























( ) ( ) ( )
' 1 tttt wfkkfkAk


































Equation (34) is the Euler equation, (35) is the first-order condition for fertility, (36) is
the budget constraint, (37) and (38) relate factor prices to the marginal productivities, (39) is the19
market-clearing condition for capital, (40) describes the evolution of the population shares of
each dynasty and (41) states that the sum of the shares must sum up to one.






















From (42) and (43), we obtain
( )












Equation (44) implies that 
j
11   ,
i kkij =" . Hence, at  1 t = , capital stocks are equal
among dynasties, independently of their initial capital stocks. From (34)-(41), we obtain that this
common value of the capital stock is equal to the steady state k :
( )
( )








To summarize, the economy converges to the unique egalitarian steady state in only one

























Equation (46) shows that high fertility dynasties discount more the utility of each child,
so their consumption grow less than the consumption of low fertility dynasties, and so does their
capital stock. From (47), it follows that richer parents (higher  0
i k ) dilute their wealth by having
more children than poorer parents. Hence, the capital stock of poorer parents grows faster than
that of richer parents, leading to convergence of the per capita capital stock among dynasties.
For log preferences and Cobb-Douglas technology, this convergence takes only one generation.
5. Model with Heterogeneity in Discount Factors
In this section, we present some results for a version of the model in which dynasties are
heterogeneous in their discount factors. Specifically, we assume that dynasty  i has discount
factor 
i b , where 01    1,...,
i iM b <<"= . Without loss of generality, we can order dynasties
according to decreasing altruism, i.e., 
12 1...0
M bbb >>>>> .
The steady state is still characterized by equations (7)-(12), but we have to replace (6)
with
10
ii Rn b = (48)
                                                                
10 It should be noted that, since fertility rates may be different across dynasties, the shares of each dynasty
in the population may vary over time in a steady state.21
From (48), we can observe that more altruistic dynasties have higher fertility rates than
less altruistic dynasties. Hence, we have 
12 ...
M nnn >>> . In order to solve for the steady
state consumption 
i c , we can rewrite (20) as
( ) ( )
1










From the analysis in section 3, we know that for each triple  ( ) ,,
i Rwn  there exists a
unique 
i c  that solves  (49). Hence, we can define  ( ) ,,
ii cgRwn = , where  ( ) ,,
i gRwn
satisfies:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1











Lemma 3 states that steady state consumption 
i c  increases with the steady state fertility
rate 
i n .
Lemma 3. Let assumptions 1-5 hold. Then,  ( ) ,,
iii cgRwn =  is strictly increasing in
i n   1,..., iM "= .
Proof. Differentiating both sides of (50) with respect to 
i n  and rearranging the terms,
we obtain that 
i
n g  satisfies:







ff Øø -- Œœ W+=-W++
Œœ --- ºß
(51)22
Since  0 c W‡ ,  0 n W< ,  Rw f >  and    1,...,
i RniM >"= , it follows from  (51) that
0
i
n g > .              QED
The following proposition states that in all steady states more altruistic dynasties have
higher fertility, consumption and capital stocks than less altruistic dynasties.
Proposition 4 . Let assumptions 1-5 hold. Then
( ) ( ) ( )
111222 ,,,,...,,
MMM ckncknckn >> .
Proof. From  (48), we obtain 
12 ...
M nnn >>> . From lemma 3, we obtain
12 ...
M ccc >>> . From (8), we can write 
i k  as a function of 
i c  and 
i n  for given ( ) , Rw:











From (52) and the previous results, we conclude that 
12 ...
M kkk >>> .        QED
Hence, in any steady state more altruistic dynasties have higher fertility, consumption
and capital stocks than less altruistic dynasties. In particular, the more altruistic dynasties tend to
grow in size relative less altruistic ones. In other words, altruism is a trait that tends to prevail
through its effect on fertility.
11
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we construct a competitive growth model in which altruistic dynasties are
heterogeneous in their initial stocks of physical capital. Parents make choices of family size along
                                                                
11 Barro and Becker (1989) show that more altruistic societies tend to grow in size relative to less altruistic
ones in an aggregative model of optimal growth with endogenous fertility.23
with decisions about consumption and intergenerational transfers. We show that, if dynasties
have common discount factors and preferences over number of children satisfy a normality
assumption, then all dynasties have the same stock of physical capital per capita in the long run.
Moreover, if consumption satisfy a normality assumption, this common level of the capital stock
is unique. If preferences are logarithmic and the technology is Cobb-Douglas, the economy
converges to the unique egalitarian steady state in one generation.
We also show that, if dynasties have different discount factors, more altrustic dynasties
have higher fertility rates in a steady state. Also, assuming a normality condition for fertility and
consumption, we show that more altruistic dynasties own higher capital stocks and consume
more in a steady state than less altruistic dynasties. Even though the stationary distribution of
consumption and wealth is non-degenerate at each point in time, asymptotically all dynasties but
the most altruistic one become an infinitesimal part of the population.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. If we differentiate (26) implicitly with respect to k , we obtain
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
''
''
2 2 11 1
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Since  ( ) ( )









, we have 
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2 . From  (14), we have
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From (14) and (15), we obtain24
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which gives the expression in the text.
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